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WHAT ARE THE STRATA'S TWO FUNDS FOR? A Strata Corporation holds its money in two separate funds, and each fund exists for a different kind of expense. The Operating Fund pays for common expenses that come up at least once a year, or that are needed to obtain a depreciation report or an electrical planning report; the Contingency Reserve Fund pays for common expenses that usually come up less than once a year, or that do not usually come up at all. It is important for Council to keep this distinction in mind before it approves any expenditure, because the Strata Property Act does not let the Strata treat its money as one pool to be spent on whatever Council decides is a good idea. Which fund an expense belongs in determines which approval process applies to it, and getting that wrong can mean the expenditure was never properly authorized at all. WHEN CAN COUNCIL SPEND FROM THE OPERATING FUND? Council can spend from the Operating Fund only if the expenditure is consistent with the fund's purpose, and only if it has also been approved by a ¾ vote, authorized in the budget, or authorized under one of the Act's own unapproved-expenditure exceptions (s.97). Both conditions must be met — an expenditure consistent with the fund's purpose but never approved is just as unauthorized as one that was approved but has nothing to do with the fund's purpose. Our understanding is that no court has yet interpreted what "consistent with the fund's purpose" or "authorized in the budget" actually requires, despite how often the Operating Fund is the fund a Strata reaches for first. This is a case where the Act's own text has to do the work without a judgment to sharpen its edges, and Council should not assume that a category loosely connected to a budget line is automatically enough. WHAT MUST THE BUDGET ACTUALLY AUTHORIZE? The Strata Property Regulation requires the budget itself to show opening balances in both funds, estimated non-fee income, Operating Fund expenditures itemized by category, contribution totals, each Strata Lot's monthly contribution to each fund, and estimated closing balances (s.6.6). Council prepares the budget, and it must be passed by a majority vote at each annual general meeting and distributed to Owners with the meeting notice (s.103). Approving a budget category is not the same question as approving a specific dollar amount. Several tribunal decisions have held that approving a category is enough: an Owner who votes for a landscaping line item authorizes spending anywhere within it, without a further vote on the specific invoice (Woytuik v. The Owners, Strata Plan VIS 5970, 2017 BCCRT 32; Hoover v. The Owners, Strata Plan KAS 1984, 2018 BCCRT 620; Haw v. The Owners, Strata Plan EPS 1869, 2019 BCCRT 509; Wong v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 2461, 2022 BCCRT 562). A "$6,000 TBD" landscaping reserve has even been accepted as adequate authorization for maintenance items not individually listed (Muller v. The Owners, Strata Plan EPS4420*], 2023 BCCRT 44). 1093870 B.C. Ltd. v. The Owners, Strata Plan NW213, 2022 BCCRT 328, points the other way: legal fees of $10,776.46 against a budgeted legal category of only $2,500 were held unapproved, because the specific amount, not just the category, must be put to the Owners. No court has yet resolved the conflict between these two lines of tribunal reasoning, so Council should not assume a category alone will protect an expenditure that runs well past what was budgeted for it. WHEN CAN COUNCIL SPEND FROM THE CONTINGENCY RESERVE FUND? Council can spend from the Contingency Reserve Fund only if the expenditure is consistent with the fund's purpose, and only if it has also been approved by the vote the type of expenditure requires (s.96). A majority vote authorizes a depreciation-report-recommended repair or replacement, EV charging infrastructure, or obtaining the depreciation report or electrical planning report itself; every other Contingency Reserve Fund expenditure requires a ¾ vote. This is a higher bar than the Operating Fund's own approval route, and it is deliberately higher. The Contingency Reserve Fund exists for the Strata Community's larger, less frequent expenses, and the Act asks for broader Owner buy-in before that money is spent. CAN COUNCIL AVOID THE CONTINGENCY RESERVE FUND VOTE BY SPENDING FROM THE OPERATING FUND INSTEAD? Council cannot avoid a failed Contingency Reserve Fund vote by funding the same project through the Operating Fund instead. In Azura Management (Kelowna) Corp. v. Owners of the Strata Plan KAS2428, 2009 BCSC 506, the Strata's ¾ vote to fund a project from the Contingency Reserve Fund failed, and the court held that routing the same expenditure through the Operating Fund would "violate the intent of the Act" (para. 132). The money itself did not change character in that case — the problem was that the section 96 vote requirement cannot be evaded by choosing a different pocket to pay from. Surplus Operating Fund contributions can still lawfully end up in the Contingency Reserve Fund, but only through the Act's own default-allocation route, which the Owners can displace by a ¾ vote of their own (s.105(1)(a); Azura, para. 133). The issue in Azura was avoiding the vote, not moving money between funds as such. WHEN CAN COUNCIL SPEND MONEY WITHOUT OWNERS' AUTHORIZATION AT ALL? Council can spend money without Owners' authorization in only two situations, both exceptions to the general rule that spending must be put to the Owners (s.98). The first is a de-minimis exception: an unbudgeted Operating Fund expenditure is authorized without a vote if it, together with every other unapproved Operating Fund expenditure made that fiscal year, stays under the bylaw-set limit or, if the Bylaws are silent, under the lesser of $2,000 and 5% of that year's Operating Fund contributions. The second is the emergency exception, and it reaches further. Council can spend from the Operating Fund or the Contingency Reserve Fund, without a vote, if it has reasonable grounds to believe an immediate expenditure is necessary to ensure safety or to prevent significant loss or damage, including obtaining or maintaining required insurance (s.98(3)-(3.1)). The expenditure must not exceed the minimum amount needed (s.98(5)), and Council must inform the Owners about it as soon as feasible (s.98(6)). This is not a new idea in strata law. An unbudgeted repair or maintenance expenditure over $500 required special-resolution approval under the *Strata Property Act*'s 1974 predecessor unless it had already been budgeted for, and the modern de-minimis and emergency routes are what carved these exceptions out of that older baseline rule (Blunt (Re), 1977 CanLII 311 (BC SC), para. 9). "As soon as feasible" is judged on the circumstances rather than against a fixed number of days, but it is not satisfied by disclosure that waits until the underlying matter is finished and the final account is rendered. In The Owners, Strata Plan VR 2213 (Re), 2021 BCSC 905, the Strata paid legal fees from the Contingency Reserve Fund under the emergency exception and did not disclose the expenditure to the Owners until the litigation concluded; the court held this did not satisfy section 98(6) (paras. 241-247). Our understanding is that the court did not go on to decide whether the legal fees themselves actually met the emergency exception's necessity test — the respondents raised that argument, but the case turned entirely on the disclosure timing instead (para. 233). It is worth noting separately that the Act does not authorize paying litigation expenses from the Operating Fund at all, which is why the Strata in that case had already moved the same fees out of the Operating Fund before relying on the emergency exception (Dockside Brewing Co. Ltd. v. Strata Plan LMS 3837, 2005 BCSC 1209, aff'd 2007 BCCA 183, considered inThe Owners, Strata Plan VR 2213 (Re), 2021 BCSC 905 at para. 230). WHAT HAPPENS IF COUNCIL SPENDS MONEY IT WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO SPEND? An expenditure made without the approval section 98 or the budget requires is not converted into an authorized one just because Council believed, in good faith, that it was necessary. A claim for reimbursement of an unapproved expenditure fails if no evidence is put forward that the emergency exception's own preconditions — a reasonable belief in immediate necessity for safety or loss prevention — actually applied (0899148 B.C. Ltd. v. Ching, 2025 BCSC 1694, para. 81). However, an unbudgeted or unauthorized expenditure does not, on its own, expose an individual member of Council to personal liability. An Owner's right to sue a member of Council personally is confined to the remedy created by section 33 for a conflict of interest under section 32; the good-faith standard in section 31 does not create a freestanding cause of action against a member of Council, and the court's inherent jurisdiction does not expand that route (Rochette v. Bradburn, 2021 BCSC 1752, paras. 82-83). This means an unauthorized expenditure is the Strata Corporation's own problem to resolve, through Council reversing course, seeking ratification, or facing a challenge from an Owner, rather than a basis, by itself, for going after the individual members who approved it. A STRATA CORPORATION MAY ONLY SPEND MONEY THE ACT AUTHORIZES IT TO SPEND The Strata Property Act does not give Council a general discretion to spend the Strata's money on what it judges to be a good idea. Every expenditure must be authorized — a budget line, a Contingency Reserve Fund vote at the level the expenditure requires, or one of the narrow unapproved-expenditure exceptions — an expenditure that does not fit one of those routes is not authorized, however sensible it may have seemed to Council at the time. The law is about line drawing here as much as anywhere else in the Act: the line between the Operating Fund and the Contingency Reserve Fund, between a category and an amount, and between an emergency and an inconvenience. Getting that line right protects both the Owners who are paying for it and the Strata Community's ability to trust that its own money is being spent the way the Act, and the Owners themselves, actually authorized.

WHAT LEGAL COSTS CAN A STRATA RECOVER WHEN IT REGISTERS A LIEN? A Strata can recover its reasonable legal costs of registering and enforcing a lien (s.118). This means the Strata's actual legal costs incurred both in and out of court, not merely the party-and-party costs a court would award in a lawsuit ([*The Owners, Strata Plan KAS 2428 v. Baettig, 2017 BCCA 377, paras 54–55, 79). "Reasonable legal costs" is the current wording of the Strata Property Act s.118(a), and the Court of Appeal has held that it captures legal costs incurred both in court and out of court, including the cost of taking out-of-court steps such as registering a lien in the first place (Baettig, 2017 BCCA 377, paras 54–55). As examples, a Strata is using its "reasonable legal costs" authority when it adds the cost of preparing and registering a Certificate of Lien even though this is not part of a legal proceeding. However, there is an open question if reasonable legal costs includes costs charged by a non-legal individual or organization. For example, we are aware that many property management companies charge a fee for sending a letter to an Owner notifying them of unpaid strata fees or a fee for referring a matter to a law firm - our expectation that this costs would not be recoverable by a Strata if they were challenged. WHEN DOES A STRATA'S POWER TO RECOVER LIEN COSTS BEGIN? A Strata's power to recover legal costs under s.118 does not begin until it registers a Certificate of Lien (625536 B.C. Ltd. v. Owners of Strata Plan LMS 4385, 2021 BCCA 158, paras 44, 49). This is a bright line, not a case-by-case inquiry: on the plain language of the Strata Property Act, s.118 only reaches the costs of registering a lien and costs added to a Certificate of Lien, and a Strata has no independent basis to claim legal costs outside that framework (625536 B.C. Ltd., paras 23–24). However, once the lien is registered, the costs of preparing the notice required before registration fold in, even though the Strata incurred them before the lien existed (625536 B.C. Ltd., para 29). This bright line reflects a deliberate interpretive choice: the Court of Appeal gave the plain statutory language priority over a purposive argument for reading s.118 more broadly, rejecting the argument that a Strata could recover costs before a lien exists (625536 B.C. Ltd., para 40). ARE ALL LEGAL COSTS RECOVERABLE, OR ONLY SOME? Only legal costs that were reasonably necessary to register or enforce the lien are recoverable under s.118 (Baettig, 2017 BCCA 377, para 79). A Strata is entitled to add its actual legal costs to the amount owing, but only to the extent those costs were reasonably necessary — this reasonableness requirement is the safeguard against a Strata sheltering excessive charges under the umbrella of the lien (Baettig, paras 78–80). In a more recent case, a strata corporation's approach to calculating its lien costs survived a challenge because the owner opposing it did not point to any authority showing the approach was flawed (The Owners, Strata Plan BCS1022 v. 1067192 B.C. Ltd., 2026 BCSC 980, paras 30, 32–34). CAN A STRATA KEEP RECOVERING COSTS AFTER THE OWNER PAYS? A Strata cannot keep recovering legal costs under s.118 once the owner has paid and the Strata has accepted the arrears, if those costs are directed solely at recovering fees (The Owners, Strata Plan EPS 7076 v 1186856 B.C. Ltd., 2026 BCSC 148, paras 68–74, 77). Once the debt is paid, the lien ceases to serve any enforcement function, so legal costs no longer have anything left to attach to — legal costs under s.118 are an incident of lien enforcement, not a self-standing debt (The Owners, Strata Plan EPS 7076, para 63). To permit recovery after payment "would risk reversing the statutory relationship between arrears and costs, making legal fees the primary object of enforcement rather than an incident of it" (The Owners, Strata Plan EPS 7076, paras 68–74). Our understanding is that this exact scope holding is not yet beyond challenge: the Court of Appeal has granted the Strata leave to appeal this point, on the basis that Baettig does not itself decide whether post-payment fee-recovery costs are recoverable (The Owners, Strata Plan EPS 7076 v. 1186856 B.C. Ltd., 2026 BCCA 248, paras 46–49). Leave to appeal is only a finding that the point is arguable, not a decision on the merits, so the rule stated above remains the law unless and until the Court of Appeal decides otherwise. HOW IS THE AMOUNT OF THE COSTS DECIDED? The amount of a Strata's s.118 costs is decided in two stages: the court decides what the Strata is entitled to recover, and the registrar then decides how much of that entitlement is a reasonable amount. Entitlement requires the costs to have been reasonably necessary to register or enforce the lien, and tethered to that purpose rather than becoming an end in themselves (The Owners, Strata Plan EPS 7076, 2026 BCSC 148, para 39); the amount itself is a separate exercise reserved to the registrar. However, the costs of the assessment hearing itself are not part of the recoverable s.118 costs. The assessment of a Strata's costs is not itself one of those costs (The Owners, Strata Plan NW 87 v Ajvazi, 2023 BCSC 1462, paras 145, 148, 150). Those assessment costs are normally assessed party-and-party under the ordinary Supreme Court Civil Rules tariff instead (Ajvazi, 2023 BCSC 1462). Our understanding is that even the division of labour between the court and the registrar is presently under appeal: the Owner in the same litigation has been granted leave to appeal whether "reasonable" should also inform entitlement at the court stage, rather than being left entirely to the registrar's assessment of quantum (The Owners, Strata Plan EPS 7076 v. 1186856 B.C. Ltd., 2026 BCCA 248, paras 37–41). As with the post-payment question above, leave to appeal does not change the law described here; it means a division of the Court of Appeal will scrutinize it. A STRATA'S POWER TO RECOVER LIEN COSTS IS BROAD BUT NOT UNLIMITED A Strata's power to recover legal costs on a lien is broader than a court's ordinary costs award. It begins only when a Certificate of Lien is registered, it includes only costs that were reasonably necessary to register or enforce that lien, and it ends when the arrears are paid. Two of those boundaries are currently before the Court of Appeal on leave granted, so this is an area of the law we are continuing to watch. Understanding the boundaries as they stand today protects a robust and resilient Strata Community from spending on costs it will never recover.

WHO CAN APPROVE A CHANGE TO THE COMMON PROPERTY? Council can approve a change to the common property on its own if the change is not significant, but the Owners themselves must approve it by vote if the change is significant. It is reasonable to assume Council can approve most changes to the common property on its own, since Council manages the Strata's day-to-day affairs. However, the moment a proposed change crosses into "significant," the decision no longer belongs to Council at all. It belongs to the Owners, voting at a general meeting, and Council has no authority to make that call for them. The vote itself is a ¾ vote at an annual or special general meeting, or a majority vote where the change relates to EV charging infrastructure (Strata Property Act, s.71). That distinction sounds simple stated this way, but the law is about line drawing, and in practice this particular line is not obvious. Courts and the Civil Resolution Tribunal have had to draw it repeatedly, through careful consideration of facts ranging from a storage shed to a rooftop deck to a change in the colour of an exterior wall, and that consideration has produced a set of practical guidelines Council can actually use. There is a presumption in law that if people understand the law, they will act consistent with what it requires, and Council cannot act consistently with a line it has not been shown. The rest of this article sets out where that line has actually been drawn, and how to tell, before Council acts, whether the decision is made by the Owners or by Council. WHAT TEST DECIDES WHETHER A CHANGE IS SIGNIFICANT? Courts decide whether a change is significant using a six-factor test set out by the BC Supreme Court in Foley v. The Owners, Strata Plan VR 387, 2014 BCSC 1333. The court weighs: Visibility to residents or the public. The effect on the use, enjoyment, or an existing benefit of a unit. If there is direct interference or disruption caused by the change. The effect on marketability or value. The number and mix of units and the Strata's general use. How the Strata has governed itself in the past, including whether it has permitted similar changes before. No single factor decides the question on its own. This is a weighed, fact-specific assessment, not a checklist where one box being ticked settles it. There is one exception. Where an alteration incorporates part of the common property into a private, exclusive-use area for the benefit of only one Owner, that alone is enough to make the change significant, even setting the other six factors aside (Foley, para. 28). Foley's six factors have been consistently applied since. Anthony v. Schnapp, 2016 BCSC 1839, quotes the same passage word for word (para. 36), and we have found no case that departs from it. HOW CONSISTENTLY DOES THE CIVIL RESOLUTION TRIBUNAL APPLY THIS TEST? The Civil Resolution Tribunal applies the *Foley* factors with a level of consistency that is unusual for a body that decides an enormous volume of these disputes. In our review of the tribunal's own published decisions on significant change, the tribunal cites Foley by name, or restates its factors almost word for word, in the large majority of decisions that actually weigh whether a change was significant. The tribunal is applying the same legal test to new facts each time, rather than developing one of its own. A single Civil Resolution Tribunal decision is a data point, not a binding decision on the next dispute; we have written about that distinction, and why it matters, in another article. What a large volume of decisions from the same tribunal can show, reliably, is a direction for how that pattern is trending on a given kind of fact pattern, even though no individual decision commits the tribunal to keep deciding the same way tomorrow. That direction is worth knowing before Council decides whether to treat a proposed change as routine. WHAT PUSHES A CHANGE TOWARD BEING SIGNIFICANT? Foley itself shows how these factors actually apply. The alteration under review there, an unauthorized deck extension and new railing, was significant because it was visible to other Owners and the public, adversely affected two neighbouring units' privacy and quiet enjoyment, likely increased the altering Owner's own unit value, and had no precedent in a Strata that otherwise governed itself by the Act and its bylaws (Foley, paras. 22-27, 29). Anthony v. Schnapp applies the same six factors to its own facts and reaches significant findings on similar grounds: raised garden beds that occupied an entire grassy corner, fruit trees planted directly in the lawn rather than kept as moveable potted plants, and a fence that was highly visible and changed the property's aesthetic theme with no explanation for why the existing cedar hedge could not simply have continued, were all found significant on the same visibility and permanence reasoning (Anthony, paras. 38, 40, 41-42). The Civil Resolution Tribunal has followed this same reasoning repeatedly in its own decisions. A hard-roofed gazebo whose solid roof and visible frame changed a patio's appearance for everyone who could see it was found significant on the visibility and permanence factors (Giddings et al v. The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 3620, 2018 BCCRT 61). A rooftop deck built for the benefit of only one Owner was found significant on the privatization factor alone, without needing to weigh the rest (Bowie v. The Owners, Strata Plan VR1122, 2019 BCCRT 1342). A cedar storage shed was found significant partly on permanence, being bolted in place rather than moveable like furniture (Berezan v. The Owners, Strata Plan NW 9, 2019 BCCRT 438). A mini-split heat pump installation was found significant on the interference factor, because of its noise impact on the adjoining Owner, even though the installation itself was not especially visible (Fleming v. The Owners, Strata Plan 1290, 2021 BCCRT 1117). WHAT PUSHES A CHANGE AWAY FROM BEING SIGNIFICANT? Anthony v. Schnapp shows the same factors pointing the other way, on different facts within the same case. Levelling and adding gravel to an existing parking spot was not significant, absent evidence it had overtaken a significantly larger area of common property (Anthony, para. 46). A shed built close to a neighbouring strata lot was not significant on these facts, distinguished from the garden beds and fruit trees by its location and its lack of interference with the neighbour's own use of the property (Anthony, paras. 47-48). Decorative, removable items point the same way: a strata council's temporary permission for potted cedar trees, a holly bush, planters, and a garden bench on a shared common-property entry way was not a significant change, since the items were modest and removable on notice rather than a lasting alteration to the property itself (Reid v. Strata Plan LMS 2503, 2003 BCCA 126, para. 31). We have written about the safety and emergency exception itself, including Anthony's own example of it working, in another article. The Civil Resolution Tribunal has applied the same reasoning in its own decisions. A genuinely documented pattern of past approvals can be decisive: where a Strata could point to eight earlier, similar patio extensions it had approved without a vote, that pattern was enough to keep a ninth extension from being treated as significant (Wilder et al v. The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 3152, 2019 BCCRT 212), though it is important to note that how much weight this kind of pattern carries has not been perfectly consistent from one tribunal decision to the next. We have written about how an Owner can rely on a Strata's own prior approval in another article, and the same caution runs the other way: Council relying on its own past practice needs that practice to be real and comparable, not just convenient. Low visibility indicates that a change is not significant: a rooftop air conditioning unit was found not significant where the roof was locked, inaccessible to other Owners, and had no effect on anyone else's use of the property (D'Onofrio v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 895, 2021 BCCRT 1033). A decorative, easily removable change is treated the same way: a paving-stone patio extension was found not significant on the same reasoning (Deane v. Cusick et al, 2019 BCCRT 539). A genuine safety exception is argued far more often than it succeeds, but it was made out where a deteriorated, rusting awning needed to come down immediately (Progressive Technologies Inc. v. The Owners, Strata Plan VAS 2828, 2019 BCCRT 715). Finally, a change to a governance, access, or cost-allocation rule, rather than a physical alteration, falls outside this question altogether, whatever the other factors might otherwise show. WHEN SHOULD COUNCIL LET THE OWNERS DISCUSS AND DECIDE? Council should treat the factors above as a self-check to run before acting, not after. A proposed change that will be visible from outside the unit, that will be bolted down or otherwise permanent, that will carve out space for the benefit of only one Owner, or that a neighbour is likely to actually feel, whether through noise, a lost view, or reduced privacy, indicates that the alteration should only be permitted if there is a resolution passed by the Owners. Our recommendation is that Council be cautious about leaning on "we have always allowed this" unless that pattern is actually documented and genuinely comparable, given how inconsistently the Civil Resolution Tribunal has weighed that same argument on similar facts. Council should also be clear-eyed about the difference between a genuine emergency and a convenient reason to skip the vote: the safety exception protects an Owner or a Strata that had to act immediately to prevent loss or damage, not one that would simply have preferred not to hold a meeting. Getting this wrong carries real consequences beyond the vote itself. A change Council approved without authority can be ordered restored at the responsible Owner's expense, or become the subject of a special general meeting called after the fact to ratify or reject what was already done. Either outcome costs more, in money and in trust, than asking the Owners in the first place would have. WHEN THE ANSWER IS UNCLEAR, THE OWNERS SHOULD DECIDE, NOT COUNCIL Council has real authority to manage the common property, but that authority stops where a change becomes significant, and that line has been drawn by a fact-specific legal test the courts and the Civil Resolution Tribunal have applied consistently for years. Council does not need to get every case right on its own. It needs to recognize the fact patterns that regularly tip toward significant, and treat a genuinely close call as a reason to ask the Owners rather than a reason to guess. The key purpose of the law is for social ordering, and a Strata Community is better ordered when everyone understands who decides a given change before it happens, not after a dispute forces the question. A robust and resilient Strata Community treats that question honestly rather than conveniently. Where visibility, permanence, exclusivity, or a neighbour's own enjoyment are genuinely in play, the decision belongs to the people who will have to live with it.

CAN AN OWNER RELY ON A STRATA'S PRIOR APPROVAL? An Owner can generally rely on a Strata's own prior approval, and a court must actually weigh that reliance if the Strata later tries to walk the approval back. Whether an Owner held a reasonable expectation about how the Strata would act is one relevant factor in the test for significant unfairness under s.164 of the Strata Property Act (King Day Holdings Ltd. v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS3851, 2020 BCCA 342). A decision-maker who treats that expectation as legally irrelevant, rather than simply giving it appropriate weight, commits an extricable error of law (Kunzler v. The Owners, Strata Plan EPS 1433, 2021 BCCA 173). Not every expectation qualifies, though, and not every approval survives a later challenge to the Strata's own authority to have given it. WHAT MAKES AN OWNER'S EXPECTATION "REASONABLE" ENOUGH TO MATTER? An Owner's expectation needs an affirmative representation behind it, not just a general impression. Our understanding is that a reasonable expectation under s.164 requires the Strata, a developer, or a zoning Bylaw to have actually led the Owner to believe they would have the specific thing they sought — general permissive marketing or zoning language, without more, is not enough (Kunzler, 2021 BCCA 173). A Strata Council's specific approval of a particular alteration or use is the clearest example of that kind of affirmative representation: unlike a marketing brochure or a zoning designation, it addresses the Owner's specific request directly. DOES AN OWNER HAVE TO ACT ON THE APPROVAL BEFORE IT BECOMES PROTECTED? An Owner's expectation is on firmer ground once they have actually acted on the approval, not merely obtained it. Our understanding is that where an Owner has taken only preparatory steps toward a use, such as hiring a professional or applying for a permit, without beginning actual use or making a binding commitment, they have no crystallized right for a later Bylaw or decision to disturb (Kunzler, 2021 BCCA 173). For example, an Owner who receives Council's written approval for a balcony enclosure and then actually builds it, at real expense, stands in a materially different position than an Owner who received the same approval but has not yet lifted a hammer. WHAT HAPPENS IF THE STRATA LATER TRIES TO WITHDRAW ITS APPROVAL? Withdrawing an earlier approval, after an Owner has relied on it, can itself be significantly unfair. Our understanding is that a Bylaw passed by a vote disproportionately cast by a bloc exempt from its own operation, targeting a minority of Owners who had a reasonable expectation founded on the Strata's own prior conduct, is significantly unfair, even though nothing was procedurally improper about how the vote was held (Semmler v. The Owners, Strata Plan NES3039, 2018 BCSC 2064). This is because s.164 is remedial: a fair, democratic process does not by itself immunize a significantly unfair outcome from review (Dollan v. The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 1589, 2012 BCCA 44). A Strata that follows every proper step to reverse a decision can still have acted significantly unfairly if the reversal defeats an Owner's reasonable, affirmatively founded reliance. IS THERE ANY LIMIT TO RELYING ON A STRATA'S APPROVAL? An Owner cannot rely on an approval the Strata never had the authority to give in the first place. Our understanding is that if a Bylaw is beyond the Strata Corporation's power, an Owner's past compliance with it, or the Strata's own past acquiescence in it, cannot found an estoppel that validates or enforces it (*B.P.Y.A. 1163 Holdings Ltd. v. The Owners, Strata Plan VR 2192, 2008 BCSC 695). The same logic applies to an approval: a Council's yes cannot manufacture authority the Strata Corporation never had, however reasonably the Owner relied on it. AN OWNER'S RELIANCE ON A STRATA'S OWN APPROVAL DESERVES REAL WEIGHT An Owner who receives a Strata's specific approval, and then actually acts on it, has a right that a court or the Tribunal must weigh, not something the Strata can withdraw for free. That reliance carries the most weight where the approval was an affirmative, specific representation and the Owner has gone beyond preparatory steps to real use or real expense. However, that weight has a ceiling: it cannot turn an approval the Strata never had the power to give into a valid one. A robust and resilient Strata Community gives its approvals carefully in the first place, because an Owner who builds on one is entitled to have that reliance taken seriously.

WHEN CAN A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE BE MADE TO THE COMMON PROPERTY WITHOUT OWNERS' APPROVAL? The Court of Appeal has clearly stated that if there are reasonable grounds to believe that safety or security requires a significant change to the use or appearance of the common property, Council can authorize that change without the Owners' consent (Reid v. Strata Plan LMS 2503, 2003 BCCA 126, para. 21). Council can act without Owners' authorization only in that situation. We have written about the general rule that a significant change otherwise requires the Owners' authorization in another article, and this is the one exception to that rule: not a second route around the Owners, but a narrow safety valve for a genuine emergency. The exception is claimed far more often than it succeeds. Knowing its real shape, and its real limits, protects Council from relying on it when a proposed change was merely convenient to make quickly, rather than genuinely necessary. WHAT MUST COUNCIL BELIEVE BEFORE AUTHORIZING A CHANGE TO COMMON PROPERTY? At the time it acts, Council must believe three things at once, drawn directly from the statute: There were reasonable grounds to believe the change was necessary. The necessity was immediate, not merely advisable or convenient. The purpose was to ensure safety or to prevent significant loss or damage, not some other benefit. Anthony v. Schnapp, 2016 BCSC 1839, shows the exception working. An owner dug a drainage trench, installed a sump, and poured a concrete patio on common property without consent, and the court found reasonable grounds to believe the work was necessary to prevent significant loss or damage, applying the exception even though the strata's own bylaw had no equivalent safety carve-out (Anthony, paras. 43-45). DOES THE EMERGENCY EXCEPTION APPLY WHEN THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE TO THE COMMON PROPERTY? The emergency and safety exception only applies when Council is considering whether section 71 of the Act applies. Council cannot rely on this exception for any other purpose. Once a court or the tribunal has already found that s.71 does not apply to the change at all, no reliance may be placed on the exception as an independent basis (Frank v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 355, 2017 BCCA 92, paras. 29-30). In Frank, a chambers judge's passing reference to the safety exception did not undermine her decision, because the strata's duty to repair the property already supplied a complete, independent basis for the result. The safety exception was beside the point once that duty did the necessary work. The law is about line drawing, and this is one more line worth holding onto: the safety exception answers whether a significant change can go ahead without Owners' authorization, not whether some other obligation, like the duty to repair, applies instead. Anthony v. Schnapp, 2016 BCSC 1839, shows the same reasoning can still usefully inform a different question outside section 71 itself. The same "reasonable grounds to believe... necessary to ensure safety or prevent significant loss or damage" language, though it has no equivalent in the strata's own bylaw dealing with owner alterations, was borrowed as a helpful guide for whether the strata should reasonably consent to an owner's own request to do work on the common property (Anthony, para. 43). HOW OFTEN DOES A CLAIMED EMERGENCY SUCCEED? A claimed emergency succeeds far less often than it is argued. In our review of the tribunal's own decisions on significant change, the Civil Resolution Tribunal keeps returning to one distinction to separate a genuine emergency from a change dressed up as one: the necessity of repairing or removing something does not, by itself, license the necessity of reconfiguring or replacing it in a materially different way. A strata facing a rotted or damaged common-property feature can usually act to fix or remove it right away, but the moment the response goes further, changing the feature's configuration, size, or function, the tribunal treats that additional step as needing its own justification. WHAT POINTS A CLAIMED EMERGENCY TOWARD SUCCESS, AND WHAT POINTS IT TOWARD FAILURE? A present, evidenced hazard, addressed by doing no more than the hazard required, tends to succeed. A deteriorated, rusting awning was found to justify immediate removal, the tribunal reasoning that requiring Owners' authorization first could have left the strata unable to meet its own repair obligations at all (Progressive Technologies Inc. v. The Owners, Strata Plan VAS 2828, 2019 BCCRT 715). Active water ingress justified replacing a flowerbed with a gravel bed on the same footprint, where a contractor had specifically warned that restoring the original flowerbed would cause further water damage (Paquette v. The Owners, Strata Plan KAS988, 2022 BCCRT 534). Necessity also has a shelf life tied to the emergency itself, not to how long the strata finds it convenient to maintain the change. A pool, hot tub, and sauna closure at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic was justified for as long as the public health emergency genuinely continued, but the tribunal found the strata was no longer justified in keeping the facilities closed six months later, once the safety concerns were no longer immediate (Brogan v. The Owners, Strata Plan 845, 2020 BCCRT 1196). Three recurring reasons point the other way. A strata cannot use the necessity of a repair to justify a different, unrelated change: rotted common-property stairs genuinely needed repair, but reconfiguring their layout, rather than fixing what was there, required its own authorization regardless of the repair need (Wong v. The Owners, Strata Plan VR 804, 2019 BCCRT 1285). The exception is judged on the evidence available at the time the change was made, not with the benefit of hindsight: a patio cover bolted into common-property concrete was not excused where nothing in the record showed it was needed for safety when it was installed, later complaints notwithstanding (Cusano v. The Owners, Strata Plan EPS4924, 2026 BCCRT 363). And where there was no imminent risk at all, the exception does not arise: a mature cedar tree that was stable and not at risk of falling could not be removed under the safety exception, whatever other reasons the strata may have had for wanting it gone (Fong v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 415, 2024 BCCRT 1239). WHEN SHOULD COUNCIL STOP RELYING ON "IT WAS AN EMERGENCY" AND REQUIRE OWNERS' AUTHORIZATION INSTEAD? Council should ask whether what was done matches what the emergency required, and for how long the emergency lasted. If the response went beyond fixing or removing the hazard, whether by reconfiguring, upgrading, or replacing the feature rather than restoring it, that additional step needs its own authorization. If the underlying risk has passed but the change is still in place because reversing it would be inconvenient, the exception has already run out. Our recommendation is that Council document the hazard, and the evidence for it, at the time it acts, since the tribunal judges necessity on what was known then, not on what later events go on to confirm or contradict. There is a presumption in law that if people understand the law, they will act consistent with what it requires, and Council cannot document a hazard correctly if it does not first understand how narrowly this exception is read. Getting this wrong carries the same consequences as any other unauthorized significant change: the change can be ordered restored at the strata's or the responsible Owner's expense, and the Owners can still end up being asked for authorization after the fact, only later and after the dispute has already cost more than seeking it up front would have. THE SAFETY EXCEPTION EXCUSES ONLY WHAT THE EMERGENCY REQUIRED The safety exception is real, but it is narrow: it excuses Council from needing Owners' authorization only for as long as, and only to the extent that, a genuine, evidenced hazard required immediate action. It does not survive once the underlying risk has passed, it does not stretch to cover a reconfiguration or upgrade riding along with a genuine repair, and it does not operate at all once a court or the tribunal has already found there was no significant change to begin with. The key purpose of the law is for social ordering, and that purpose is served here by keeping the exception narrow: an emergency that justified acting without authorization once should not become a standing excuse to act without it again. A robust and resilient Strata Community treats "it was necessary at the time" as a claim that has to be shown, not merely asserted.

WHAT IS AN ADMINISTRATOR? An administrator is a person the Supreme Court appoints to take over some or all of a Strata Corporation's own powers and duties, in place of Council and the Owners, when the Strata's own governance has broken down (Strata Property Act, s.174). The Strata Corporation itself can apply, and so can an Owner, a tenant, a mortgagee, or any other person with an interest in a Strata Lot (s.174(1)). The court can appoint an administrator for a set period or an indefinite one, hand over as much or as little of the Strata's own powers and duties as it decides, and relieve the Strata Corporation of them to the same extent (s.174(3)). An administrator's role is not adjudicative. As the court put it in appointing one, "his role is that of administrator," and, to be effective, "an administrator requires the confidence of the strata lot owners" (Andrews v. Leno, 2001 BCSC 963, para 36). That last point runs through everything below: an administrator who cannot win the Strata Community's own confidence has not actually fixed anything. WHAT MUST BE SHOWN BEFORE A COURT WILL APPOINT AN ADMINISTRATOR? A court must be satisfied that appointing an administrator is in the best interests of the Strata Corporation, a standard weighed against five factors the courts have developed since Lum v. Strata Plan VR519 (Owners of), 2001 BCSC 493: A demonstrated inability to manage the Strata Corporation. Demonstrated substantial misconduct or mismanagement. Whether an administrator is necessary to bring order to the Strata Corporation's affairs. A struggle among competing groups that is impeding proper governance. Whether an administrator is the only reasonable prospect of bringing order. No single factor decides the application. The court weighs all five together against the facts before it, and the cost of the appointment itself is always part of that weighing (Lum, para 11). This is a genuinely open-ended, fact-sensitive inquiry, not a checklist an applicant can complete and expect to win. WHY IS APPOINTING AN ADMINISTRATOR TREATED AS A LAST RESORT? The court treats appointing an administrator as a last resort because it takes governance out of the Strata Community's own hands, and the case law says that should happen only when absolutely necessary. As Lum itself put it, "the democratic government of the strata community should not be overridden by the Court except where absolutely necessary" (para 12). That restraint has teeth. In 1049442 B.C. Ltd. v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 1669, 2018 BCSC 1631, twelve separate complaints were raised against a Strata Corporation — improper items on an AGM agenda, a fee overpayment, a fee undercollection, an unfair parking allocation, a budget that failed to pass, delayed repairs to a leaking ceiling. The court found the Strata's conduct "lax and sloppy in certain respects," but "not sufficiently egregious to justify the appointment of an administrator," and held that specific orders addressing each complaint were the better remedy than displacing the Strata's own government entirely (para 5). It is important to recognize that this is a genuine floor: conduct must fall well short of an administrator appointment before a Strata can rely on it, and the more targeted remedy is the one the court reaches for first. IS CONFLICT OR ACRIMONY BETWEEN OWNERS ENOUGH ON ITS OWN? It is reasonable to assume that any Strata dysfunctional enough to end up in court would qualify for an administrator, but conflict or acrimony between Owners is not enough on its own. The court must see an actual breakdown in the Strata's own ability to govern itself, not Owners who dislike each other, or a dispute one side lost. Lum is a clear example, and has been relied on by several later judgments. Ten Owners sought an administrator after a dispute over the Strata's resident manager escalated into arbitration; nine of their twelve complaints traced back to that same dispute. The court found the building's condition "excellent" and under "active professional management" throughout, and refused the application, holding that even the "continuing acrimony and rancour" it could see traced to one group's dissatisfaction with the arbitration's result, not to any actual impediment to governance — "I am not, however, able upon an application of this nature to do more than adjudicate upon the application" (paras 26-30). The same pattern repeats elsewhere: in Yamagata v. The Owners, Strata Plan NW 1546, 2019 BCSC 286, the court refused appointment because the Strata Council had "worked diligently and conscientiously to deal with difficult issues" (paras 60-61); and in Tepper v. The Owners, Strata Plan 785, 2018 BCSC 223, the court refused because the dispute was one Owner's alone, against an otherwise responsive Strata whose own missteps had already been fixed (para 110). Contrast that with 0899148 B.C. Ltd. v. Ching, 2025 BCSC 1694, where an administrator was appointed after five years in which the Strata Corporation held no annual general meeting, elected no Council, and ignored its own contingency reserve fund and budget obligations. Or Anthony v. Schnapp, 2016 BCSC 1839, a two-lot strata where the two Owners each held half the votes and could not pass a single resolution — the court found that "informal structure no longer works for these owners" and that "formal structure needs to be followed" (para 52). The law is about line drawing, and this is a clear line it draws. On one side are Owners who are frustrated with each other, or unhappy with a result they did not want. On the other are Stratas that genuinely cannot function — that cannot pass a resolution, cannot hold a productive meeting, cannot make a basic repair decision. A Strata sits on the acrimony side of that line when one faction remains upset about an arbitration outcome inside an otherwise well-run building (Lum), and on the governance-breakdown side when two Owners are locked at a permanent tie and nothing can pass at all (Anthony v. Schnapp). CAN A COURT REFUSE TO APPOINT THE SPECIFIC PERSON PROPOSED? A court can refuse to appoint the specific person proposed as administrator, even when the Strata's own dysfunction otherwise justifies an appointment. In Yamagata, the petitioner proposed a managing broker at $225 an hour, supported only by her own second-hand description of a conversation with him — no affidavit from the nominee himself was filed. The court refused to appoint him on that ground alone, separately from its finding that the Lum factors were not otherwise made out (paras 62-64). However, an unqualified nominee is not the only problem a proposed administrator can present. In Murphy v. The Owners, Strata Plan VR 1291, 2026 BCSC 634, the proposed administrator had already made public comments revealing a settled view on the very repair option the appointment was meant to investigate. The court found no suggestion of bad faith, but preferred "an administrator who has not yet expressed a view on the options" (para 115), because one side of the dispute could reasonably discount any recommendation from someone seen as having already made up his mind. That is the same confidence-based logic Andrews v. Leno describes: an administrator only restores governance if the Strata Community can actually accept the outcome, and a nominee whose own prior statements make that acceptance unlikely has not solved the problem, whatever their qualifications. WHEN HAVE COURTS APPOINTED AN ADMINISTRATOR? Courts have appointed an administrator when a Strata's own governance has genuinely stopped functioning, scoping the appointment to match the actual breakdown, not further. Murphy is a good illustration of that scoping. The dysfunction the court found there was confined to a single repair issue — persistent water ingress on one wall of the building — with the rest of the Strata's affairs conceded to be properly managed. The administrator appointed was not given authority over the whole Strata; the order was limited "for the sole purpose of ensuring the strata corporation discharges its obligation under s.72(1)... to repair and maintain the building envelope on the west elevation" (para 121(d)). The remedy matched the actual problem, and nothing more. Timing matters too. In The Owners, Strata Plan NW981, 2022 BCSC 2038, the court said it would have had "no hesitation in ordering an administrator to take over" based on the Strata's history of disrepair and unresponsiveness, but the Strata had made "a dramatic shift" since the petition was filed, producing records, holding an AGM, and completing nearly every repair an inspection report had identified (paras 25-26). The court held that the assessment is made as of the hearing date, not the date the petition was filed, and refused appointment on that basis (para 27). It also rejected the idea that the petitioner's own frustration settled the question, holding that "the subjective impression of the petitioner is not the issue" (para 24). This is also not a remedy available anywhere but the Supreme Court. The Civil Resolution Tribunal has held it has no jurisdiction to appoint an administrator, because that power belongs to the Supreme Court alone under s.174 (Garry v. The Owners, Strata Plan EPS2501, 2021 BCCRT 409, para 31). The tribunal has applied the same limit even to a lesser substitute: an order that a strata manager be given authority to make governance decisions without Council's involvement was refused, because that would functionally amount to an administrator appointment and fall outside the tribunal's own jurisdiction (Wagner v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 104, 2025 BCCRT 1665, paras 74-75). AN ADMINISTRATOR RESTORES GOVERNANCE; IT DOES NOT SETTLE A DISPUTE BETWEEN OWNERS The appointment of an administrator is the answer to only one question: is the Strata Corporation incapable of governing itself on the date of the court hearing. Appointing one replaces Council's and the Owners' own decision-making, temporarily and to whatever extent the court orders, so that repairs get decided, budgets get passed, and meetings produce resolutions. It does not answer why two Owners cannot get along, and it does not decide who was right in the underlying dispute between them. That is why a court that finds a Strata's governance still intact will refuse the application, even when real acrimony exists (Lum; Yamagata;Tepper), and why a court that does appoint an administrator will limit the appointment to the actual governance failure it found, no further (Murphy). It is also why the proposed administrator's own neutrality matters as much as the Strata's own dysfunction: an administrator one side of the dispute cannot accept has not restored governance either (Murphy; Andrews v. Leno). A robust and resilient Strata Community resolves its own disputes through Council, its bylaws, and the more targeted remedies the Strata Property Act already provides. An administrator is what happens once none of that is working, not a substitute for making it work in the first place.

The Strata Property Act requires that the Developer establish the Initial Contingency Reserve Fund and the minimum amount that must be deposited is 10% of the interim budget if a strata lot is sold within one year after the creation of the Strata and 50% of the interim budget if a Strata Lot is sold more than one year after the creation of the Strata. However, these minimums likely presume that the Strata is a relatively new construction. We are aware of several Stratas that have been created and the Developer owned all the strata lots for several years, usually as rental accommodation. There are a lot of practical reasons for this, including: Zoning or development restrictions that favour a Strata development over a single building. Government initiatives or incentives that reflect the number of dwelling units that are created instead of through a single building. Creating flexibility to sell off individual strata lots in the future in conditions that may make selling an entire development to a single purchaser difficult. Tax implications. Financing implications. Benefits to ownership through a Corporation instead of through ownership of individual strata lots. However, this creates a problem because the Contingency Reserve Fund is essentially completely unfunded. This is contrary to the purpose of a Contingency Reserve Fund. A Contingency Reserve Fund is for common expenses that usually occur less often than once a year or that do not usually occur. Implicitly, this is to ensure that those expenses can be made without requiring a special levy be imposed on Owners. The BC Supreme Court has said that a Strata is obligated when there are “many deferred maintenance items” to “consider the amount of funds in the Contingency Reserve Fund”. For most portions of a Strata, deterioration occurs over a period of time. For example, a roof may have an expected lifespan of 50 years. If the cost of replacing the roof in $1,000,000 then $20,000 a year should be contributed to the Contingency Reserve Fund so that there is enough money in the fund when the roof must be replaced. Using this model, sometimes referred to as the “Current Replacement Cost New of Reserve Items”, a Developer that owns all the strata lots should be contributing $20,000 a year to the Contingency Reserve Fund. This is not the model used with the minimum contribution provision in the Strata Property Act. The requirement in the Strata Property Act for a Developer to act in good faith and with a view to the best interests of the Strata should inform the amount that a Developer must deposit to the Initial Contingency Reserve Fund. This would be consistent with the overall design and purpose of the Strata Property Act which includes an aspect of consumer protection. Consequently, we believe that the Initial Contingency Reserve Fund should be a range from the minimum specified in the Act to an amount that is equal to the Current Replacement Cost New of Reserve Items. We made this argument before the BC Supreme Court in 2024 and unfortunately, the judge did not agree. In that situation, the court stated “At its core, the Strata Corporation’s argument amounts to a submission that the legislature ought to have set the minimum contribution amount in s. 12(3) of the SPA at a higher level where the strata property in question is older and the owner developer is aware of significant deferred maintenance items. While there may well be policy arguments that could be advanced in support of such a change, that is not the choice the legislature made at the relevant time.” We note that the BC Government has increased the minimum contribution amounts in the Strata Property Act but it has not adopted our proposal. However, despite the BC Government not amending the Strata Property Act, there is the opportunity to create change through the market. Developers can highlight the decision of the amount of their contribution to the Initial Contingency Reserve Fund in their marketing materials and purchasers can either favour purchasing strata lots from Developers that have properly funded the Contingency Reserve Fund or can try to negotiate a purchase price that reflects the likelihood that Owners will be required to pay money by Special Levy to fund repairs whose cost exceeds the money available in the Contingency Reserve Fund.

WHAT IS AN ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING? The Strata Property Act requires every Strata to hold an annual general meeting no later than two (2) months after the Strata’s fiscal year end. The Strata Property Act has several references to what must or can occur at an annual general meeting, but there is no statement regarding the purpose of an annual general meeting. Our experience, working with an uncounted number of Stratas is that the most effective annual general meetings involve both the efficient resolution of routine business with respectful and productive discussions of situations where there was no pre-existing consensus. At the extreme, we are aware of a Strata (based on legal advice) that had only a single resolution at a general meeting. That one resolution purported to approve the budget, amend the bylaws and elect the council with a single resolution passed by a ¾ vote. We suspect it was done as a way for the Council to push through an unpopular bylaw by linking it with all the other essential business. We do not encourage or support that approach! WHAT ARE THE MAIN PURPOSES FOR AN ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING? We believe that there are five primary purposes for an annual general meeting: To enable collective decision-making. To decide certain routine matters on an ongoing basis, such as budgets and insurance coverage. To decide whether to take certain special measures or steps. To permit the consideration of proposals from owners. To decide who is most appropriate to exercise the powers and obligations of the Strata as a member of the council. WHO DETERMINES THE AGENDA FOR AN ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING? We frequently get questions from Council and from Owners about whether the Council gets to decide what happens at an annual general meeting or if the Owners get to decide. There is no simple answer. The Council gets to decide what is on the agenda that is included with the notice package for the annual general meeting. This is usually done at the council meeting preceding the distribution of the notice package. However, during the meeting when the Owners are resolving to accept the agenda, there can be a motion to add additional proposals. In this way, neither the Council nor the Owners get to decide what happens at an annual general meeting. WHAT IS AN EFFECTIVE AGENDA FOR AN ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING? Our experience has convinced us that an effective meeting starts with effective preparation and a thoughtful agenda. There is always a limit on the time available for a meeting and it is important that priorities are established and the more routine aspects of a meeting can be moved through expeditiously. Here is what we recommend as the agenda (order of business) for an Annual General Meeting: Register eligible voters, certify proxies, and issue voting cards. Call the meeting to order. Elect a person to chair the meeting, if necessary. Determine that there is a quorum. Present proof of notice of meeting, Approve the order of the agenda, Approve the minutes of the most recent general meeting or waiver of notice of meeting, Deal with any unfinished business, Receive reports of council activities and decisions since the previous annual general meeting, Ratify any new rules made by the Strata Corporation since the previous annual general meeting, Report on insurance coverage, including the certificate of insurance and the most recent appraisal, Approve the budget for the coming fiscal year, Deal with other matters, Elect a council, Terminate the meeting. HOW DOES A STRATA ENABLE COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING? Collective decision making is not a specific activity but should be in involved in every aspect of the annual general meeting. There is a clear ‘flow’ to the administration of a Strata: At the annual general meeting the Owners decide on the business of the Strata. The Council operates the business of the Strata and keeps owners informed through minutes. If the Council is uncertain about its authorization or the preference of the Owners it calls another general meeting to get authority or instructions from the Owners. At the next annual general meeting the Owners evaluate the conduct and effectiveness of the Council and decide whether other people should have an opportunity to be on Council. It is important for Owners to appreciate and act responsibly regarding the fact that a Strata is a community that operates on democratic principles. HOW DOES A STRATA DECIDE ON THE BUDGET? A proposed budget will be provided in the notice package for the annual general meeting. The budget will be explained by category of expenditure. We have written about categories of expenses in another article and what the options if there is a budget surplus or deficit. It is important to take the time to review the budget and to understand what is being proposed. There should be information regarding the proposed budget to the prior budget so you can identify areas where it is expected that expenses will increase and areas where they are expected to decrease. It is also very useful to consider the Contingency Reserve Fund. When considering the proposed amount to be contributed to the Contingency Reserve Fund compare it with the information in the Depreciation Report. We have discussed the usual funding models in a Depreciation Report in another article. You should understand how the proposed contributions to the Contingency Reserve Fund may affect the likelihood that the Strata will be required to raise money by enacting a Special Levy. You are not required to fully understand the nuance of the proposed budget, but you should be familiar with how it communicates how the Council expects the next fiscal year to progress. It is important to remember that approving a budget is simultaneously the authorization for the Council to choose service providers based on the approved expenditure. A budget is approved by a majority vote, and this means it can be amended during discussion by motions from the Owners. The budget is not a ‘take it or leave it’ proposition and Owners must recognize that it is crucial, as part of supporting a robust and resilient strata community, that everyone understands and has some ownership over the budgetary decisions. HOW DOES A STRATA DECIDE ON INSURANCE COVERAGE? Strictly speaking, the Strata Property Act requires the Council to report on insurance coverage at each annual general meeting and to inform Owners of any material change to insurance coverage including changes in an insurance deductible. However, the Council does not have complete discretion regarding selection of the terms on the insurance coverage. The payment of the insurance premium is an expense that is included in the budget that requires owners to approve. In general, there is an inverse relationship between the cost of the premium for the policy and the amount of the deductible. As the deductible increases, the cost of the premium decreases. The appropriate balance between the cost of the premium and the amount of the deductible is a critical decision for Owners to make and should not be unilaterally left to the Council to decide. It is important for Owners to recognize that in most instances, the deductible will be paid as a common expense and the money will come from the operating fund, the contingency reserve fund or be raised by special levy. Owners must be comfortable with this responsibility and have input into how much risk exposure they are prepared to accept with a deductible. Depending on the size of the Strata and its loss history, it may be reasonable to identify in the operating budget the payment of the deductible one or more times during the year. It may also be reasonable, for a Strata that does not expect that losses occur annually, to essentially ear-mark the payment of a deductible from the money in the Contingency Reserve Fund. We have worked with Stratas where the Contingency Reserve Fund is based on significant necessary expenses for repairs (roof and building envelope repairs) and does not include any funds for the payment of an insurance deductible. HOW DOES A STRATA DECIDE ON SPECIAL MEASURES OR STEPS? The annual general meeting usually involves two general forms of special measures – the Owners directing the Council by majority vote and the amendment of Bylaws. The Strata Property Act permits Owners, at a general meeting, to pass a resolution by a majority vote to direct Council regarding the exercise of its authority. This form of resolution is most commonly done at an annual general meeting and can take several forms. An example would be to direct Council to retain a specific service provider. We have an article regarding the direction of Council that describes this process in greater detail. The second common special measure at an annual general meeting is the changing, repealing, replacement or amendment of Bylaws. This is done by a resolution passed by a ¾ vote. Owners must be provided with the wording of the proposed Bylaw with the notice for the annual general meeting and during the discussion of the Bylaws there is no ability to make any substantive change to the resolution. The amendment to the Bylaws is not enforceable until it has been filed with the Land Title and Survey Authority of British Columbia (LTSA). WHEN DOES A STRATA CONSIDER PROPOSALS FROM OWNERS? We do not recommend that Owners raise proposals at the annual general meeting that have not been shared with other Owners before the meeting. Instead, what we recommend is that Owners are provided with an opportunity to propose resolutions prior to the distribution of the notice for the annual general meeting and that the interested Owner can speak first during discussion of the resolution. We have repeatedly experienced Stratas where there has been a fragmentation of the community and a conflict between the Council and a group of Owners regarding what is appropriate to be considered at a general meeting. Our recommendation is that everything be included in the agenda and then by resolution the Owners who attend the meeting can determine what resolutions are actually discussed. It is important to appreciate that democratic principles control a general meeting – no resolution is discussed unless there is a motioner or a seconder and calling a vote on a resolution when discussion is perceived as no longer necessary or efficient is done by a majority vote. No individual or group of individuals that constitute less than a majority of the people present can dictate or control the conduct of the meeting. WHEN IS A STRATA COUNCIL ELECTED? At each annual general meeting the members of Council are elected. Each person that stands for election must receive a majority vote of the votes cast to have them elected. This is the opportunity for Owners to directly affect how the Strata will be operated. One question that we frequently receive is a variation of: Our Bylaws say that Council should be between 3 and 5 people and only 5 people volunteered to be on Council. Does that mean that all of them are on Council without needing to be approved by a resolution? The answer to this question is that every person needs to be approved by a resolution regarding being elected to be a member of Council. It is not hard to imagine a situation where someone that the majority of Owners do not want to be a member of Council becoming a member of Council because there are not enough other people willing to stand for election. For the same reason, the election of the members of Council should not be based on a ‘slate’ where an Owner is compelled to vote for multiple people when they believe that not all of those people should be a member of Council. ROBUST AND RESILIENT STRATA COMMUNITIES ENGAGE FULLY WITH THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING PROCEDURES The proper conduct of Annual General Meetings is critical to supporting a robust and resilient strata community. The Annual General Meeting is the opportunity for collective decision making and community building. It is important that all participants understand the purpose of the meeting, have reviewed the notice package, and are prepared to fully participate. For most Owners, it is the key opportunity for them to participate directly in the governance of the Strata. That opportunity should not be squandered because of a restrictive agenda, a too controlling chairperson, or the failure to provide relevant information far enough in advance that Owners can thoughtfully engage with that information.

WHAT IS IMPLIED WAIVER OF SOLICITOR-CLIENT PRIVILEGE? Implied waiver of solicitor-client privilege happens when a Strata Corporation gives up solicitor-client privilege through its own conduct, whether or not it intends to give up anything at all (S. & K. Processors Ltd. v. Campbell Ave. Herring Producers Ltd., 1983 CanLII 407 (BC SC), paras 6, 10). We have written about express waiver, where the Strata Corporation actually knows the privilege exists and chooses to disclose; implied waiver is a separate risk, and it is the more dangerous one, because a Strata can trigger it without anyone ever using the word "privilege." The test has three elements, and all three must be satisfied before a court will find implied waiver: The Strata must have put its own state of mind in issue. The Strata must have obtained legal advice about the matter. The Strata must have voluntarily injected that legal advice, or its understanding of the law, into a dispute in a way that is material to an issue in it (Long v. Red Branch Investments Limited, 2022 BCCA 293, para 26; , Soprema Inc. v. Wolrige Mahon LLP, 2016 BCCA 471). Each element gets its own heading below, followed by what we consider the two situations most likely to catch a Strata by surprise: circulating a legal opinion to Owners officially, and discussing one informally. WHEN DOES A STRATA CORPORATION PUT ITS OWN STATE OF MIND IN ISSUE? A Strata Corporation puts its own state of mind in issue when the position it takes turns on what it believed, understood, or intended about its own legal position, not merely when its state of mind happens to be relevant to the facts (Doman Forest Products Ltd. v. GMAC Commercial Credit Corp., 2004 BCCA 512, paras 27-28). A claim that necessarily requires proof of a party's own state of mind, such as negligent misrepresentation, satisfies this element on its face (Soprema, paras 2, 17-18). It is reasonable to assume that any dispute touching on a decision Council made would put the Strata Corporation's state of mind in issue, but that assumption is too broad. A mere denial of wrongdoing, or an assertion that Council acted "lawfully" or "in good faith," does not by itself satisfy this element; an Owner cannot force a Strata Corporation to waive privilege simply by alleging misconduct and inviting a response to the allegation (Camp Development Corporation v. South Coast Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority, 2011 BCSC 88, paras 88, 94-99, applying the Doman distinction). The state of mind that matters is the Strata Corporation's own understanding of its legal position, not a general claim about how it conducted itself. IS OBTAINING LEGAL ADVICE ABOUT THE MATTER ENOUGH ON ITS OWN? Obtaining legal advice about the matter is not enough on its own to waive privilege. It is the second of the three elements, and it is satisfied simply by showing the Strata Corporation received legal advice about the transaction or dispute in question (Soprema, para 6). However, this element is rarely in dispute and never decides the question by itself. Nearly every Strata has obtained legal advice about significant decisions, and satisfying this element still leaves the third and most demanding element to be proven. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO VOLUNTARILY INJECT LEGAL ADVICE INTO A DISPUTE? Voluntarily injecting legal advice into a dispute means the Strata Corporation itself puts the substance of that advice, or its own understanding of the law, forward to justify or explain a decision it made, in a way that is material to an issue the dispute must resolve. This is the element that does the real work: satisfying the first two elements is not enough, because "the weight of authority supports the proposition that a party must voluntarily inject ... legal advice it received or its understanding of the law before waiver can be implied" (Soprema, para 49). Injection can come from a pleading, from evidence, or from argument, and it normally requires the Strata Corporation to assert reliance on the advice, not merely to have received it (H.M.B. Holdings Limited v. Replay Resorts Inc., 2018 BCCA 263, para 46). For example, a Strata Corporation that pleads it delayed a claim until it obtained legal advice on a limitation period has injected that advice, even without quoting a word of it. By contrast, a Strata Corporation that merely asserts it consulted a lawyer, without relying on what the lawyer actually said, has not — asserting the existence of legal advice is not the same as relying on its content (Peak Products Manufacturing Inc. v. Gross, 2023 BCCA 214, paras 57-59). This is also where the "sword and shield" idea applies. Fairness and consistency require production when a Strata Corporation uses privileged advice as a sword, a positive reference to justify a decision, while also using it as a shield to stop an Owner from testing that justification (Huang v. Silvercorp Metals Inc., 2017 BCSC 795, paras 143-146). A Strata Corporation that claims "we imposed this Special Levy because our lawyer told us we had to" is using the advice as a sword; it cannot then refuse to produce the advice itself as a shield. CAN ATTACHING A LEGAL OPINION TO MINUTES OR TO A NOTICE FOR A GENERAL MEETING WAIVE PRIVILEGE? Attaching a legal opinion, or even a summary of one, to Strata minutes or to a notice for a general meeting can waive privilege over the whole of it. This risk does not come from the three-element test above; it comes from a separate, sibling doctrine of implied waiver that does not require a showing that state of mind was in issue or that anything was injected into a dispute at all — waiver of privilege as to part of a communication is waiver as to the entire communication (S. & K. Processors, para 6; Huang, paras 147-155). A notice for a general meeting under s.45 of the Strata Property Act must describe the resolutions to be voted on, and a Strata that wants Owners to approve a Special Levy, or a bylaw amendment, on the strength of legal advice will often be tempted to attach the opinion, or quote its conclusion, to explain why. Doing so discloses the opinion to every Owner entitled to notice, not to a single trusted recipient, and quoting only the conclusion while withholding the reasoning behind it is exactly the partial disclosure this doctrine treats as unfair (Huang, paras 148-152). The same reasoning that supports a finding of waiver when a litigant discloses part of an opinion applies with at least as much force when a Strata attaches part of an opinion to a document every Owner will read. DOES INFORMALLY DISCUSSING LEGAL ADVICE WITH OWNERS CREATE THE SAME RISK? Informally discussing legal advice with Owners creates the same risk as attaching it to a written record, because the doctrine looks at what was actually disclosed, not the disclosure's format. A member of Council who tells Owners at an Annual General Meeting, or in a hallway conversation, that "our lawyer said we could do this" has disclosed the substance of the advice just as surely as if it had been printed in the minutes. This is because privilege is not preserved by informality. An oral summary given in response to an Owner's question at a meeting, without a written record, still counts as a voluntary disclosure of the advice's substance, and if that summary is later relied on to justify Council's decision in an actual dispute, it can satisfy the voluntary-injection element as readily as a pleading would (Huang, paras 143-146). It is important for Council to understand that "we were just explaining our reasoning to the Owners" is not a defence; a court asks what was disclosed and why, not whether it happened in writing or in conversation. STRATAS SHOULD TREAT ANY DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL ADVICE TO OWNERS THE SAME WAY THEY TREAT A DECISION TO WAIVE PRIVILEGE Implied waiver does not require a Strata Corporation to intend anything. It can arise from the three-element test, when the Strata Corporation puts its own state of mind in issue, has obtained legal advice, and voluntarily injects that advice into a dispute to justify what it did. It can also arise, independently of that test, from partial disclosure alone, whenever the Strata discloses part of an opinion without the rest. However, both routes converge on the same practical point once legal advice is shared with Owners, whether attached to minutes, or to a notice for a general meeting, or explained informally at a meeting. Our recommendation is that Council treat any disclosure of legal advice to Owners, official or informal, as a decision with the same consequences as a deliberate waiver, made by resolution and only after turning its mind to whether disclosure actually serves the Strata Corporation's own interests. Keeping that discipline is what allows a robust and resilient Strata Community to explain its decisions to Owners without giving up the protection its legal advice is supposed to provide.

WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF A STRATA LOT? It is important for Owners and the Strata to be able to have the correct legal description of a Strata Lot because this is what is used by the Land Title and Survey Authority of British Columbia (LTSA) when retrieving official documents. The LTSA is the place to retrieve official records, including: A Strata's official Bylaws. The Strata Plan. The Strata's Official Mailing Address. Title to the Common Property and Strata Lots. HOW CAN YOU IDENTIFY THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF A STRATA LOT? The legal description of a Strata Lot in BC follows a similar structure for most Strata Lots. The structure is: 1. Strata Lot #. 2. Strata Plan #. 3. Legal Description of the larger plan. 4. Reference to interest in the common property as shown on Form V for Strata Lots created after July 1, 2000). For example: Strata Lot 1, Plan EPS4233, Section 33, Esquimalt Land District, together with an interest in the common property in proportion to the unit entitlement of the Strata Lot as shown on Form V. All properties in BC also include a Property Identification Number or Permanent Parcel Identifier (PID). A PID is a nine-digit number that is unique to each title and is created by the Registrar of land titles. WHAT IS THE EASIEST WAY TO GET THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF A STRATA LOT? The easiest way to get the legal description of a Strata Lot is by using the BC Assessment Website. If You Know the Mailing Address On the website, there is a very convenient "Find your property assessment" banner: The option for "Civic Address" is useful if you have the street address for the Strata. For example, the street address for EPS4233 is 3111 Havenwood Lane, Victoria. If you put in 3111 Havenwood Lane Victoria in the field, an option to select all units is presented: If you click on that bar, a table is populated providing all the properties in that Strata: Clicking on one of the units will link to the BC Assessment "Property Information" for that property. The Property Information includes the "Legal description and parcel ID". If You Know the Strata Corporation Number The process is the same when you know the Strata Corporation Number as it is when you know the street address for the Strata, except that you have to select "Plan" instead of "Civic Address" as the left hand option. To follow the same, example, here is what it looks like when Plan EPS4233 is entered into the form: There is an option to insert the "lot #" as well. If this is done, then the BC Assessment "Property Information" for that property will be displayed. However, the "lot #" field can be left blank. If it is left blank, then a table is populated providing all the properties in the Strata: IS THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF A STRATA LOT PRIVATE INFORMATION? The legal description of a Strata Lot is not private information and it is easily accessible through the internet, including through the webpage for BC Assessment. The information provided by BC Assessment also includes the mailing address, the property details, the property valued history and the sales history. It is important that Owners and Stratas understand the how to get the legal description of a Strata Lot because that description is how official documents can be retrieved from the LTSA.